Defense ministry due for reform / Internal communication, Diet oversight of SDF among priorities

Hidemichi Katsumata / Yomiuri Shimbun Senior Writer

The government has started to work for reform of the Defense Ministry through such measures as integration of the Self-Defense Forces and the ministry's administrative functions. But what factors need to be taken into account as part of such reforms?

"It takes too much time for the defense minister to obtain information under the current structure," a senior officer of the Air Self-Defense Force said. He sounded angry as he spoke, and with good reason.

In October, an F-2 fighter jet of the ASDF caught fire on takeoff at Nagoya Airport, which is run by the Aichi prefectural government. The ASDF then suspended all F-2 flights until it determined the cause of the accident. It was then learned that a simple mistake in wiring had been made during maintenance checks by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd.

"It took two days for the minister to be informed. This is a serious flaw for a military organization," the senior officer said.

When any accident or incident occurs as part of SDF activities, reports are usually made by the SDF field officers involved to relevant Ground, Maritime or Air Staff Office officers. These officers then brief relevant division and bureau chiefs of the ministry's administrative organs. The officials then report to the minister and secretaries to the minister.

The ASDF senior officer said: "It takes time [for administrative officials] to understand highly technical matters. In reforming the ministry structure, a system under which the senior SDF officers in charge directly report to the minister with the presence of administrative officials in urgent cases should be considered."

The intrusion of a nuclear submarine of the Chinese Navy into Japanese territorial waters near Ishigakijima island in Okinawa Prefecture in November 2004 revealed poor communication within the ministry.

Koichi Furusho, who was the chief of staff of the Maritime Self-Defense Force at that time, recalled, "It took time for the director general of the then Defense Agency to be informed of that incident, and much time was spent on coordination between the Construction and Transport Ministry, which oversees the Japan Coast Guard, and the Defense Agency."

"As a result, two hours and 40 minutes passed after the intrusion took place before an order for maritime defense action was issued," Furusho added.

A month later, a tsunami disaster followed a powerful earthquake off Sumatra, Indonesia. Coincidentally, MSDF vessels that were engaged in refueling activities in the Indian Ocean had just left Singapore heading for Japan. Without waiting for permission from the defense chief, Furusho ordered the MSDF units to head for the area hit by the disaster. Although this decision was in keeping with the spirit of seamanship, which dictates that mariners will always come to the aid of those in peril on the sea, Furusho could have been criticized for acting without due process.

"I asked the secretariat to immediately contact the defense chief, but I didn't get any response. Further delay in the government's response would have left the vessels further away from the disaster site," Furusho said. The MSDF then became the first to offer rescue services at the request of Indonesian authorities.

With the SDF under civilian control, it is natural that information should be immediately conveyed from officers on the spot to the defense minister, with the government and Diet then taking charge of mobilizing SDF personnel. But as the above cases show, it is far from certain that the SDF will always be able to respond immediately in situations including emergencies under the current structure and system.

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Learning lessons of the past


There is an old but still relevant episode that bears remembering. According to U.S. archives and other documents, the U.S. military intercepted a radio transmission on April 14, 1943, indicating that Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Combined Fleet, planned to inspect a frontline base on the Solomon Islands. After the cipher was decoded, the information was conveyed to U.S. naval command in the Pacific, then to the chief of the U.S. Navy, and to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt. On April 17, three days after the message had been deciphered, a presidential order to shoot down the aircraft carrying Yamamoto was issued to U.S. military units on Guadalcanal Island. The next day, the aircraft carrying Yamamoto was duly shot down.

This incident took place 65 years ago. But Defense Ministry officials should take it to heart, as it took two days for the defense minister even to be informed of the cause of a simple accident. The U.S. military reportedly requires that important information be conveyed from field officers to the president within nine minutes.

Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba has proposed that the three forces and the ministry's administrative functions be integrated, and that ministry bodies be reorganized with regard to defense policy and procurement, SDF operations, and Diet affairs and public relations.

The proposals would require drastic reform, and thorough discussions should first be held on their merits. It is hoped, however, that reform will be carried out, starting with the establishment of an organization under which civilian control of the SDF is guaranteed in all circumstances. Current Diet handling of defense matters is far from satisfactory.

Drastic reform of information and liaison systems would be the first step in that process. Such reforms could create the ideal basis for military forces in a democratic state.

(Feb. 9, 2008)